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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

l

Plaintiff-Respondent, 5
V •

4

LARRY PASCOE,

)t

Defendant-Appellant.

Case NoJ 870269-CA

Priority No. 2

i

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of Automobile
Homicide, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-5-207 (Supp.1987). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the
appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED pN APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's

jury voir dire question as beyond the scope 0f the proceedings?
2.

Whether the trial court properlv admitted the blood

test results where defendnat had not been informed he was under
arrest and defendant consented to the blood test?
3.

Whether the trial court property admitted the

accident scene photographs into evidence?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was convicted of Automobile Homicide, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann+ S 76-5-207 (Supp.
1987), after a jury trial held May 5, 1987 through May 8, 1987,
in the Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State

of Utah/ the Honorable J. Dennis Fredrick/ Judge/ presiding.
Defendant was sentenced to serve a term not more than five years
in the Utah State Prison (R. 131). Defendant now appeals his
conviction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the night of June 1, 1986/ defendant was driving
home from a private supper club in his black pick-up truck on
12600 South in Salt Lake County (R. 178/ pp. 121f 423). Mr.
Lyman Farley and his wife Audrey were following defendant's
vehicle and observed defendant's driving pattern (R. 178/ pp.
121/ 186). Mrs. Farley told Mr. Farley not to pass defendant
because defendant's truck was swaying (R. 178/ pp. 121/ 186).
Mr. Farley followed defendant for about three or four miles at a
distance of two or three car lengths (R. 178/ p. 121).
While following defendant/ the Farley's observed
defendant's vehicle go onto the shoulder of the road and also
cross the yellow center line several times (R. 178/ pp. 122 t 1878).

Mr. Farley said that defendant was on the road about half of

the time and off the road about half the time (R. 178/ p. 122).
At least once# all four wheels of defendant's vehicle went onto
the shoulder of the road (R. 178/ p. 188). Mr. Farley estimated
defendant's speed at 40 miles an hour (R. 178/ p. 122).
When defendant crossed the Jordan River# he accelerated
"real fast" (R. 178/ pp. 123/ 139). The Farleys lost sight of
defendant's truck for about 40 to 50 seconds as defendant went
around a curve (R. 178/ pp. 129/ 190). When the Farleys reached
the point where defendant's tail lights were last seen/ they

could not see the black truck anywhere (R. 1}8, pp. 130f 140).
Further down the road, they saw defendant's truck on a lawn
facing the direction it had come (R. 178, p. 131). Defendant was
laying on the ground in front of the black pick-up truck (R. 178,
pp. 131-2).
In a parking lot a few blocks away^ Officers Harvey
Heed and Brent Christensen were sitting in their vehicle when
heard a loud crash and observed sparks (R. 178, pp. 212-13, 269).
They arrived at the scene within 45 seconds tR. 178, pp. 213,
169).

Upon arrival, Officer Heed observed defendant being aided

by two elderly people (R. 178, p. 215). As Officer Heed
approached defendant, he smelled a "strong o^or of alcohol" (R.
178, p. 215)

Officer Heed asked defendant it

he had been

drinking Ici. Defendant replied, "If you thihk I have been
drinking, I want to take a test" (R. 178, p. 216).
Several other officers responding to the accident scene
observed defendant and formed an opinion that defendant was under
the influence of alcohol (R. 178, pp. 218, 274, 367, 402).
Defendant was not placed under arrest at the accident scene
because the police were busy searching for £ child which someone
had heard crying (R. 178, pp. 20-21, 217,-16 270). Also, Reserve
Officer Mark Peterson, who was in custody defendant, was fearful
for his own safety if he further agitated dependant by notifying
him that he was under arrest (R. 178, pp. 26, 30, 43).
At the scene and later at the hosp|ital, defendant and a
i

friend caused quite a disturbance (R. 178, pb. 43, 271, 273).
Because of the commotion, Officers Michael Mitchell and Mark
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Peterson requested three additional officers as back up at the
hospital when they arrested defendant (R. 178, pp. 42-3).
At the hospital, police told defendant that they "had
probable cause to believe that he was under the influence of
alcohol" and that they were going to draw blood (R. 178, pp. 41,
47).

After being so advised, defendant held out his arm and

said, "Okay."

JId. The blood test revealed a blood alcohol level

of .21 within two hours of the accident (R. 4; R. 178, p. 471).
At the accident scene, police found two opened bottles
of alcohol in defendant's truck (R. 178, pp. 255, 293, 296). The
accident investigation showed that the red pick-up truck driven
by the victim had taken evasive action, was struck in its lane,
shoved back, and cut in two (R. 178 p. 241, 309, 354). Defendant
did not brake before impact (R. 178, p. 130). After impact,
defendant's truck spun, rolled over, and traveled about 100 feet
on it's roof (R. 178, pp. 310-1).

Defendant's vehicle came to

rest on its wheels some 189 feet from the point of impact (R.
178, pp. 307, 311). The driver of the red pick-up, Jeffery Dean
Chandler, was dead at the scene (R. 178, pp. 134, 269).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
During jury voir dire, defendant requested the court to
ask prospective jurors whether they had ever worked with an
insurance claim agency.

The trial court denied defendant's

request and ruled that the question went beyond the scope of the
proceedings.

Because the requested question was not relevant to

determining jury bias, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to ask the question.

This Court recently rejected defendant's claim that a
defendant must be placed under arrest prior to taking a blood
test pursuant to the Utah Implied Consent Statute.

In any event,

the trial court determined that defendant wals under arrest and
consented to the blood test.
Because defendant did not argue in the trial court that
the photographs were gruesome, this Court should not consider
defendant's claim on appeal.

In any event, :he photographs were

not gruesome in comparison with other cases femd were admitted
after a careful weighing of their probative bnd prejudicial
value.

Where the trial court determined that their probative

value outweighed any prejudice, this Court should not disturb the
lower court's ruling in the absence of a showing of an abuse of
discretion.

The lower court did not abuse its discretion in

ruling that the photographs were probative tp reconstruct the
accident scene.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS pISCRETION
IN DETERMINING THAT DEFENDANT'S QUESTION
DURING JURY VOIR DIRE WENT BEYOND |rHE SCOPE
OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
Defendant's first claim of error ib that the trial
court erred by restricting defendant's questioning of prospective
jurors during voir dire.

Defendant's claim JLB meritless.

A trial court "has some discretion! in limiting voir
dire examinations," which "discretion should be liberally
exercised in favor of allowing counsel to elicit information from
prospective jurors."

State v. Worthen, 89 U^ah Adv. Rep. 21, 24
-5-

(S. Ct. August 23, 1988).
be relevant.

Further, the information gathered must

State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984).

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[m]atters of possible
bias and prejudice on the part of the jury are within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and its rulings on whether to
question veniremen with respect thereto will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it is demonstrated that the Court abused its
discretion."

Maltby v. Cox Construction Co./ Inc., 598 P.2d 336,

341 (Utah 1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 945 (1979).
In the instant case, defendant asserts that the trial
court did not allow defendant to fully explore possible bias and
prejudice of the jurors.

Defendant requested the court to ask

the jury if "they have directly or indirectly worked with
insurance agencies or claim adjustment or claim bureau, worked
the period of their life or adult life." (R. 179, p. 28). The
trial court denied the request explaining that the question
regarding insurance went beyond the scope of the proceedings.
Id.

Defendant now claims that the question was asked in order to

discover if any of the jurors had close working relations with
law enforcement agencies.
Notably, defendant did not ask the jurors if they had a
close working relationship with law enforcement agencies.

In

fact, two jurors were married to police officers and defendant
did pursue possible bias in that regard (R. 179 p. 19, 31).
Surely, defendant could have asked the jury if any of them had a
working relationship with police officers and, if so, whether it
would influence their judgment.

Defendant also claims that the requested inquiry would
have explored whether jurors had knowledge of "how insurance
companies handle these cases" (Br, of App. at p. 4). Respondent,
like the trial court, fails to perceive the relevance of this
inquiry.

Defendant does not even attempt to speculate how

knowledge of insurance claims is relevant to whether defendant
committed vehicle homicide.

In the absence <pf a clear

explanation how this question was relevant to jury bias, this
Court should find that the trial court properly ruled the
question beyond the scope of the proceedings
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED DEFENDANT'S
BLOOD TEST RESULTS.
A. The Utah Implied Consent Statute Does Not
Require A Defendant to Be Under Arfest Prior
To Taking A Blood Test.
Defendant next claims the trial coiirt erred in not
suppressing defendant's blood test results,

He claims that the

blood tests were inadmissible because he was not under arrest at
the time the blood was drawn and was not told the results could
be used against him.

Defendant's claim must be rejected.

The Implied Consent statute provides as follows:
(1) Any person operating a motor jvehicle in
this state is considered to have given his
consent to a chemical test or tests of his
breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of
determining whether he was operating or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while having a blood or breath alcbhol
content statutorily prohibited, or while
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
conbination of alcohol and any drug under
Section 41-6-44, if the test is or tests are
administetered at the direction of a peace
officer having grounds to believe that person
-7-

to have been operating or in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while having a
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily
prohibited, or while under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol
and any drug under Section 41-6-44.
Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-44.10(1)(a) (1988).

In State v. Wight, 97

Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah App. December 1, 1988), this Court
rejected the claim now asserted by defendant.

This Court ruled

that if "an arrest has not taken place, the subject is entitled
to know the purpose for which the blood is drawn and the subject
may withdraw the statutory implied consent."

Jd. at 29, citing,

In Re I., R.L., 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987), cert, granted,
765 P.2d 1277 (1987).

Further, this Court observed that the

Implied Consent Statute does not require an arrest prior to
taking a blood sample.

Wight, at 29.

In fact, the statute only

requires a preceding arrest for the purpose of revoking a
person's drivers' license for refusing to take a test when
requested by a peace officer.

Utah Code Ann.

§§ 41-6-

44.10(2)(a) and (8). Therefore, it is immaterial whether
defendant was arrested prior to drawing the blood sample.
B. Defendant Did Not Withdraw His Statutory
Implied Consent After Being Informed Of The
Purpose Of The Blood Test.
Defendant contends that he neither consented to the
blood test nor was he told the purpose for which the blood was
drawn.

Defendant's contentions are meritless.

In the present case, the trial court found that defendant had
been arrested pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-6(1)(1982). (R.
178, p. 78).

As discussed above, a subject "is entitled to know the
purpose for which the blood is drawn and thel subject may withdraw
the statutory implied consent."

Wight, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29.

No further warnings or explanations are required
In the present case, Officer Heed bommented to
defendant at the accident scene that, "it smells like you have
been drinking." (R. 178, P. 18). Defendant Responded, "If you
think I have been drinking, I want to take a test,

Id.

Later at the hospital, Officer Mitchell, Reserve
Officer Peterson, and blood technician Brianj Davis, approached
defendant in the x-ray room and informed defendant they wanted to
draw blood from him (R. 178, P. 40-41).

Whep defendant asked

why, Officer Mitchell advised him that they "had reason to
believe that he was under the influence of atIcohol" and that
based upon that probable cause, they were gopp.ng to draw blood (R,
178, p. 41, 47). After Officer Mitchell had so advised
defendant, defendant held out his arm and sap.d, "Okay." Id.

No

force was used to draw the blood. (R. 178, pi. 42). Based upon
this evidence the trial court found that defendant consented to
the blood test "by saying, 'Okay, go ahead,1 and holding out his
arm to provide a site"

(R. 178, p. 79).

The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that an
appellate court will not set aside a trial court's factual
finding unless it is "clearly erroneous" giving due deference the
trial court's determination of the credibility of the witnesses.
State v. Kelly, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 3 (S. Cr. September 23,
1988), citing State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).
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In

light of the strong evidence that defendant was informed of the
purpose of the blood draw and that he did not withdraw his
statutory implied consent, this Court should not disturb the
lower court's finding.
Defendant relies on this Court's opinion in In Re I.,
R.L., 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987), cert, granted, 765 P.2d
1277 (1987) where this Court concluded that "the blood test
evidence must be excluded as the product of an unconstitutional
search and seizure."

Ici. at 1128.

In that case, the defendant

resisted the blood test and was not informed that the blood test
was being taken to determine blood alcohol content.

Id.

at 1128.

This Court further stated that "under the circumstances,
reasonable minds could conclude that blood was being withdrawn
for medical rather than law-enforcement purposes." Id.

Because

the defendant was not informed of the purpose of the test and he
physically refused the test, this Court found that the Implied
Consent Statute procedures were not followed.
The present case is distinguishable from I., R.L. and
is consistent with the Wight opinion.

Here, defendant was told

by police that he was suspected of being under the influence of
alcohol and that they were going to draw his blood (R. 178, p.
41, 47). Defendant said MOkay,M and held his arm out without
resistance.

Id.

Additionally, defendant had earlier requested

to be tested in response to the police officer's statement that
he suspected defendant to be intoxicated (R. 178, p. 18). Under
these circumstances, defendant consented to the blood test as
provided by the Implied Consent Statute.

Defendant further claims that the police were obligated
to inform him that the blood test could be used as evidence
against him in a homicide investigation,

Thp Implied Consent

Statute does not require a police officer tol inform a defendant
of the purpose of the test beyond determining blood alcohol
content.

See Wight, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29

Because defendant

does not support his claim with relevant legal analysis or
authority, this Court should not consider hi p claim.

See State

v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984).
Defendant also claims that the pol ice had a duty to
inform him that he could refuse the test.

T pis argument was

rejected by the Utah Surpeme Court in State V. Whittenback, 621
P.2d 103 (Utah 1980) where the Court said:
Clearly the prosecution has the butden of
establishing from the totality of phe
circumstances that the consent was
voluntarily given; however, the prpsecution
is not required to prove that defendant knew
of his right to refuse to consent in order to
show voluntariness. . . .
Id. at 106 (Footnote omitted).

Because the prosecution is not

required to prove defendant knew of his right to refuse,
defendant's argument must fail.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN ADMITTING ACCIDENT SCENE PHOTOGRAPHS INTO
EVIDENCE.
Defendant's final claim is that th£ trial court erred
in admitting photographs of the accident sce^e which defendant
claims were gruesome and cumulative.
meritless.
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Defendant's argument is

Relevant evidence may be excluded under Rule 403, Utah
R. Evid. under the following circumstances:
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on
grounds of prejudice, confusion# or waste of
time.
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 403.

The Utah Supreme Court has required a

stricter standard of admissibility where the evidence to be
introduced is a "gruesome" photograph.
P. 2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988).

State v. Lafferty, 749

Accordingly, a gruesome photograph

is admissible only if its "essential evidentiary value" outweighs
its potential for prejudice.

State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752

(Utah 1986); State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 64 (Utah 1983).

The

more inflammatory the photograph, the greater the need to
establish its essential evidentiary value, and conversely, the
greater its essential evidentiary value, the greater the
defendant's burden to show its prejudicial effect.
P.2d at 64.

Garcia, 663

In either case, the decision to admit the photograph

is within the sound discretion of the trial court and that
court's decision must not be overturned unless an abuse of
discretion is clearly established.

JId. at 64.

Gruesome photographs are generally inappropriate unless
they have an unusual probative value.
1256-57.

Lafferty, 749 P.2d at

This strict standard of admissibility is due to the

unusually strong propensity of gruesome photographs to "unfairly

prejudice, inflame, or mislead a jury."

Id.jat 1256.

On the

other hand, "photographs that are only negligibly gruesome have
little potential for unduly prejudicing the jury, and their
admission therefore does not constitute an abuse of the court's
discretion."

State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050

1055 (Utah 1987).

While the gruesomeness of a photograph is difficult to
quantify, a review of Utah case law provides a framework from
which the present case can be measured.

In State v. Poe, 21 Utah

2d 355, 441 P.2d 512 (Utah 1968), the Utah Supreme Court reversed
a first degree murder conviction based on th^ lower court's
erroneous admission of color slides taken during the course of
the victim's autopsy.

The Court described the color slides

introduced in that case as follows:
The colored slides were made during the
course of an autopsy. To describe "[them as
being gruesome would be a gross understatement. One of them, for example,
depicted the deceased's head, showing the
base of the skull after the skull cap and
brain had been removed by the pathologist.
The skin is peeled over the edge of the skull
showing the empty brain cavity. Another is a
top view of the empty cavity. . . J
Poe, 441 P.2d at 514. The high court concluded that the gruesome
slides "could very well have tipped the scales in favor of the
death penalty."

Jki. at 515 (footnote omitted).

Similarly, in State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983),
the Utah Supreme Court found that a photograph showing a stabbing
victim's bloody corpse was gruesome.

However, when the gruesome

photograph was taken in context with other admissible
photographs, the court found that the "impact of gore was not so
significant as to render its admission an abulse of discretion so
-13-

prejudicial that it requires reversal."

Jd. at 65 (citations

omitted).
In State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986), the State
introduced photographs of a homicide victim lying face up in a
pool of coagulated blood.

The Utah Supreme Court, in applying

the strict admissibility standard, found that the photographs
were gruesome, were not relevant to rebut defendant's claim of
extreme emotional distress, and were unduly emphasized by the
prosecutor,

^d.

at 754-55.

Upon finding that the error was not

harmless, the court reversed and remanded the case for a new
trial.

Id. at 755-56.
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Lafferty,

749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988) determined that the photographs
admitted into evidence were gruesome.

In Lafferty, the State

introduced a photograph showing a baby's corpse lying in a crib
with its blood-covered throat sliced open.

Jd. at 1256. Another

photograph showed the corpse of the baby's mother lying
unnaturally contorted in a pool of blood,

^d.

While the court

found the photographs to approximate the gruesomeness found
reversible in Poe and Cloud, their admission was harmless in
light of the lack of emphasis on the photographs and the
overwhelming evidence of guilt.

IdL at 1257.

In the present case, defendant objected to exhibits
eleven or twelve as cumulative, and exhibits ten, fifteen, or
sixteen as cumulative (R. 178, pp. 266, 290). He argued that
only one photograph from each set should be admitted.

Id.

However, he did not argue or object on the grounds that the

photographs were gruesome.

It is well-established that a

defendant waives any issue regarding the admissibility of
evidence if he fails to state a timely and specific objection.
See Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1); State v. Mitchekl, 671 P.2d 213, 214
(Utah 1983); State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982)
(contemporaneous objection rule applied).

Because defendant did

not specifically raise the gruesomeness issue before the trial
court, this Court should not consider defendant's claim on
appeal.
In any event, the photos were not gruesome when
compared to the relevant cases discussed above.

In the present

case, the photos generally depicted the relative positioning of
the vehicles involved in the accident.
11, 12, 15 and 16.)

(See| State's Exhibits 10,

Exhibits eleven and twelve depict accident

debris including vehicle parts and a tennis shoe.
fifteen, and sixteen depict the victim's truck.

Exhibits ten,

A clean white

sheet is covering the victim's body lying in a horizontal
position in the bed area of the truck.

One clothed leg is

exposed from about mid-calf to the bottom of the shoe worn by the
victim.

There is no blood on the sheet, on the visible clothing,

or on the truck.

In sum, there is no comparability with the

bloody corpse photos found to be gruesome in Poe, Garcia, Cloud,
and Lafferty.

Accordingly, defendant's claim strains common

sense and should be disregarded.
Finally, defendant claims that the[photos were
cumulative.

It is well-settled that it is the trial court's

responsibility to weigh the relevance of evidence against its
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prejudice and the court's decision will not be overturned on
appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown.

State v. Garcia,

663 P.2d 60, 64 (Utah 1983).
In the instant case, the photographs were used to
clarify and illustrate the testimony of a police officer who
reconstructed the accident scene from evidence at the scene (R.
178, pp. 86, 291-325).

The photographs were probative and

essential in determining from the accident scene evidence whether
defendant was negligent, an essential fact in the case (R. 178,
p. 86). The fact that the same evidence could have been provided
by purely testimonial means does not in itself make a photograph
inadmissible.

State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Utah 1987);

State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah 1983).

Cf. State v.

Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986).
In its ruling, the trial court stated:

"I have

reviewed those exhibits, and it is my judgment that they are not
unnecessarily cumulative to the point that they will rise to any
level of prejudice on the part of defendant."

(R. 178 p. 290.)

In light of the trial court's ruling, defendant's argument is
unpersuasive that one photograph is not objectionable but one or
two more photographs are reversibly prejudicial.
Even if the trial court erred in admitting the alleged
cumulative photos, this Court should not reverse the conviction
unless the error "'is something substantial and prejudicial in
the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its
absence there would have been a different result.'"

State v.

Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985) quoting State v. Urias, 609

P.2d 1326, 1329 (Utah 1980).

In light of the strong evidence of

guilt, this Court should find that the trial court did not commit
prejudicial error in admitting the challenged photographs.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, respondent! respectfully
requests this Court to affirm defendant's copviction.
DATED this fc>&L day of February, 1989.
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